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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]

vs.

]|

KELLY S. BARNHART,

]

Defendant/Appellant.

])

Case No. 920357-CA

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal in this
matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18a-l (1)(a)
(1990) and Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3 (2)(f) (1991).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Was the Defendant, Kelly S. Barnhart, "in actual physical
control of a vehicle" at the time of his arrest, as set forth in
Section 41-6-44 of the Utah Code Annotated.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
CONSIDERED DETERMINATIVE
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44 (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 23, 1992, a little before 9:00 p.m., Officer
Bill Mathews of the St. George Police Department was dispatched to
the parking lot of Lin's Thriftway (a supermarket located at on
Bluff Street in St. George, Washington County, Utah) because of a
report by Rod Orton (the owner/operator of Lin's Thriftway) of a
suspicious vehicle in his parking lot after closing time (Tr. 6).

Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Mathews approached a blue 1983
Buick and saw the Defendant passed out behind the steering wheel on
the driver's side of the vehicle. The officer noted that the keys
were in the ignition.

The Defendant later admitted that the had

driven the vehicle to the parking lot.
When the officer, through some effort, was able to waken
the Defendant, he noticed that there was a strong order of
alcoholic beverage coming from the Defendant, that his speech was
slurred and his balance was poor.

The officer then had the

Defendant perform some field sobriety tests, which the officer felt
he failed. At that conclusion of those tests Kelly S. Barnhart was
arrested.
At the jail the Defendant was asked to take a breath
intoxilizer test, to which he consented.

The result of that test

was a blood alcohol level of .18 (Tr. 10).
The Defendant admitted that he consumed two cans of beer
prior to driving his vehicle to the Thriftway and seven more cans
of beer while at the Thriftway (Tr. 5).

The Defendant's girl

friend arrived at the scene and it was her intention to take the
car from the Defendant and drive it thereafter (Tr. 7 ) .
The Court, after hearing the stipulated facts, reading
the reports entered into evidence, and hearing the arguments by
both parties, found that the Defendant was in actual physical
control of the vehicle, that he had a blood alcohol level of .18 as
shown by an intoxilizer test, which is above the State of Utah
legal blood alcohol limit of .08, that these events occurred in St.
George, Utah, and that the Defendant was guilty of being in actual
2

physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
pursuant to Section 41-6-44, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended
(Tr. 20-10).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The State of Utah argues that the Defendant was in actual
physical control of a vehicle while he was under the influence of
alcoholic beverages.

The basis for this argument is that the

Defendant was passed out in the driver's seat, that the keys were
in the ignition, that the automobile was operable, and that the
Defendant could have started and operated the vehicle at any time.
The State also contends that the trial court's finding of the
Defendant's guilt was proper and should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
As this Court is already aware, this case comes before
the Court of Appeals on stipulated facts, and as this Court ruled
in Richfield City v. Walker. 790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990), this
Court does not have to defer to the trial court's findings because
the trial court's interpretation "becomes a question of law." Id,
at 89.

However, it is the position of the State of Utah that the

trial court made no error in finding that the Defendant had "actual
physical control of a vehicle," nor was the resulting guilty
verdict in error.
Both this Court in Richfield City and the Utah Supreme
Court in Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982) place
great weight on public policy and legislative intent. Garcia found
that "[a]s a matter of public policy and statutory construction, we
believe that the

'actual physical control' language of Utah's
3

implied consent statute should be read as intending to prevent
intoxicated

drivers

from

entering

their

vehicles

except

as

passengers or passive occupants." 645 P.2d at 654. In the instant
case, Kelly S. Barnhart drank two beers, got behind the wheel and
drove to Lin's Thriftway where he drank seven more beers (which he
brought with him) while he sat behind the wheel of the vehicle with
the key in the ignition.

It is obvious that the intent of the

legislature is to thwart situations where persons get behind the
wheel and do their drinking there.

This is most evident by the

enactment of the open container statutes as found in Section 41-644.20, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended).
In fact, the Garcia court cited Hughes v. State. 535 P.2d
1023 (Okla. Cr., 1975) which stated that "an intoxicated person
seated behind the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is a threat to
safety and welfare of the public."

It was also stated that the

danger is less than actual operation of the vehicle but is still a
risk. In fact Oklahoma court found that a "defendant when arrested
may have been exercising no conscious volition with regard to the
vehicle, still there is a legitimate inference to be drawn that he
placed himself behind the wheel of the vehicle and could have at
any time started the automobile and driven away."
1024.

535 P.2d at

That same inference can be made here where Barnhart could

have, at any time before passing out, reached out and with a flick
of his wrist started the motor and become the driver of a motor
vehicle with the "propensity to cause harm."

State v. Bugger. 483

P.2d 442, 444 (Utah, 1971).
This Court in Richfield cited State v. Smelter, 36 Wash.
4

App.

439, h,/4 P. 2d 690 (1984)
i
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argues
f Bugger

In Bugger, the Defendant was

in the back seat of the vehicle and had the car keys with him while
he was parked off road.

Recent Developments. 79 Utah L.Rev. 191,

193 (1987) . Barnhart, on the other hand, was behind the wheel, the
keys were in the ignition, and the vehicle was parked in a parking
lot from which he could have driven and endangered many innocent
persons almost immediately upon turning the key in the ignition.
In Garcia the Utah Supreme Court found "actual physical
control" where an individual whose car was blocked between another
vehicle and a fence tried to move the vehicle.

Even though he

could go nowhere, the court found he had control.

In Barnhart

there was nothing to prevent the Defendant from leaving the scene,
which created a more dangerous situation than Garcia because
Barnhart was in a position where he could have driven the vehicle
and placed the public at large at extreme risk.
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986), the
Utah Supreme Court found that an individual who was found in a
vehicle parked next to a phone booth, asleep, leaning on the
vehicle's steering wheel, with the keys in the ignition, and in a
vehicle which that defendant claimed would not start to be in
"actual physical control" of that vehicle. That court stated that
the cases finding "actual physical control" used "the premise that
as long as a person is physically able to assert dominion by
starting the car and driving away, he has substantially as much
control over the vehicle as he would if he were actually driving
it," thus relying on Adams v. State. 697 P.2d 622, 625 (Wyo. 1985).
In Barnhart, the Defendant had the power to start the car and drive
off at any time prior to passing out or upon awakening.
6
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Richfield City is also important because it creates a
"totality

of

the

physical control."

circumstances" rule

in determining

"actual

This Court found that:

Relevant factors for making this determination include,
but are not limited to the following: (1) whether
defendcint was asleep or awake when discovered; (2) the
position of the automobile; (3) whether the automobile's
motor was running; (4) whether defendant was positioned
in the driver's seat of the automobile; (5) whether the
defend was the vehicle's sole occupant; (6) whether
defendant had possession of the ignition key; (7)
defendant's apparent ability to start and move the
vehicle; (8) who the car got to where it was found; and
(9) whether defendant drove it there.
790 P.2d at 93.
In Barnhart, in reference to item (1) , the Defendant was
deemed to have passed out behind the wheel by the trial court,
which is consistent with those who over-indulge in alcoholic
beverages.

In reference to item (2) , the car was in a parking lot

which offered easy access to St. George city streets.

Regarding

item (3), the motor was not running; however, it only took a turn
of the key already in the ignition to change that situation. Item
(4) asks whether the defendant was behind the wheel, and the answer
to this question is a resounding yes.
Defendant

Barnhart

was

the

only

As to condition (5) , the
person

in

the

vehicle.

Circumstance (6) is also positive, in that the Defendant possessed
the key because it was in front of him in the ignition and he had
used it to drive himself to the Thriftway. As to item (7) , whether
the Defendant could start the car and move the vehicle, the answer
is yes. Had Barnhart not passed outf he was in a position to start
and move the vehicle he was in.

In reference to number (8), the

car got to Thriftway by the Defendant driving it there.
8

Finally,
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CONCLUSION
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 j / ^ day of November, 1992.
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stricted solely to tort actions. Yet, no conclusive authority is cited for this conclusion. Conversely, Art. 10, § 4, Wyoming
Constitution, says _^ * * * [S]uch fund
shall be in lieu of, and shall take the place
of any and all rights of action against
any employer * * *." (Emphasis added.)
The majority imposes liability on the
state to indemnify Befus by virtue of a
"statutory indemnity contract." This concept sounds like a mutation or hybrid. To
my knowledge a "statutory indemnity contract" has no legal basis. I do not feel the
legislature in this state created such a concept. Even if there was such a concept, I
seriously doubt the legislature ever meant
it to apply to a situation such as this.
Obviously the holding in this case has
doubtful ramifications for future application. Furthermore, the "statutory indemnity contract" invented by the majority cannot be compared to an express or implied
indemnity contract as discussed in Pan
American Petroleum Corporation v.
Maddux Well Service, supra.
In his dissent in the Pan American case,
Justice Raper disagreed with allowing a
third-party claim for indemnity from the
employer, stating:
"The majority decision has rendered
meaningless the concept of workmen's
compensation that ' "[i]n adopting the
new system both employees and employers gave up something that they each
might gain something else, and it was in
the nature of a compromise; * * *."'
Stephenson v. Mitchell, ex rel. Workmen's
Compensation
Department,
Wyo.1977, 569 P.2d 95, quoting from
Zancanelli v. Central Coal & Coke
Company, 1918, 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981.
What they got was: '* • * The right of
each employee to compensation from
such fund shall be in lieu of and shall
could murder his employees and be absolutely
immune from civil liability. Conversely, the
heirs of a murdered employee could only collect
worker's compensation. Parker v. Energy Development Company, Wyo., 691 P.2d 981 (1984);
and Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., Wyo.,
687 P.2d 885 (1984).

take the place of any and all rights of
action against any employer contributing as required by law to such fund in
favor of any person or persons by reason~of any such injuries or death/ § 4
Art. X, Wyoming Constitution.
"But now, through the employment of an
artful manipulation of words, misdirection of legal hypotheses and disregard
for the clear language of the constitution, the employer does not have the insurance he has paid for. The employee
now may indirectly, through use of a
third party go-between, obtain an additional recovery from the employer he
could not obtain directly. When that is
the case, then as observed by the trial
judge, 'it appears the constitutional immunity is nearly at an end.'" Pan
American Petroleum Corporation v.
Maddux Well Service, supra, at 12261227.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm
the district court's disallowance of Befus'
claim for indemnification, as well as the
Hamlin claims.
(O !«YNUMB£RSYSUM>

Donald Mark ADAMS,
Appellant (Defendant),
v.

The STATE of Wyoming,
Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. 84-173.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
April 9, 1985.
Defendant was convicted before the
Natrona County Court, Stephen E. DavidUnder the circumstances of this case, however, the majority is not so solicitous of the state
of Wyoming as an employer paying into the
worker's compensation fund. Under the authority of this case a plaintiff (Hamlin) can do
indirectly what he could not do directly. He
can use a straw man or conduit (Befus) and
collect twice from the state.

ADAMS v. STATE

Wyo.
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Cite as 697 P.2d 622 (Wyo. 1985)

son, J., of being in actual physical control
of his parked vehicle while intoxicated, and
he appealed. The District Court of Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J., affirmed, and
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court,
Brown, J., held that: (1) the element of
"actual physical control" contained in statute making it an offense for any person
who is under the influence of intoxicating
liquor to have actual physical control of
any vehicle, was not unconstitutionally
vague, and (2) evidence was sufficient to
support a finding that defendant was in
actual physical control of his vehicle at the
time of his arrest.
Affirmed.
1. Automobiles <s=>316
The element of "actual physical control" contained in statute making it an offense for any person who is under the
influence of intoxicating liquor to have actual physical control of any vehicle, was
not unconstitutionally vague. W.S.1977,
§ 31-5-233(a).
2. Statutes <3=>188
Words of a statute are to be interpreted in their ordinary, everyday sense unless
a contrary interpretation is indicated in the
specific statute.
3. Automobiles <3=>332
Where former statute merely made it
an offense for anyone to drive while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor, new
law which makes it an offense to "drive" or
"have actual physical control" of any vehicle was intended by the legislature to apply
to persons having control of a vehicle while
not actually driving it or having it in motion. W.S.1977, § 31-5-233(a).
4. Automobiles <3=>332
Legislative intent in enacting the "actual physical control" portion of statute
making it an offense for any person who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor to
drive or be in actual control of any vehicle,
was apprehending the intoxicated driver
before he could do any harm by operating
motor vehicle. W.S.1977, § 31-5-233(a).

5. Automobiles e=>355(6)
Evidence that defendant was found unconscious and intoxicated in driver's seat
behind the steering wheel of automobile 20
feet off the highway with the keys in the
ignition in the off position, the lights off,
and the engine not running was sufficient
to support finding that defendant was in
actual physical control of his vehicle at the
time of his arrest. W.S.1977, § 31-5233(a).

Donald L. Painter, Casper, for appellant
(defendant).
A.G. McClintock, Atty. Gen., Gerald A.
Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael A. Blonigen, Asst Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee (plaintiff).
Before THOMAS, CJ., and ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.
BROWN, Justice.
Appellant was convicted of being in "actual physical control" of his parked vehicle
while intoxicated. He raises two issues on
appeal:
"I
"Whether the element of 'actual physical
control' contained in Section 31-5-233(a),
W.S.1977, is unconstitutionally vague?
"II
"Whether there existed sufficient evidence to support a finding that appellant
was in 'actual physical control' of his
vehicle at the time of his arrest * * V
We will affirm.
On May 17, 1983, at approximately 11:30
p.m., appellant was found by Highway Patrolman-Tom Chatt parked near Highway
220 between Casper and Rawlins, at or
near Milepost 75, with his vehicle off the
right side of the highway about 20 feet.
The engine was not running, none of the
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lights were on, and the keys were in the
ignition but in the off position. Appellant
was unconscious and intoxicated. He was
in the driver's seatrbehind th£~steering
wheel.
When Officer Chatt arrived, appellant
did not respond to audible stimuli but did
awaken when shaken by the officer. Officer Chatt characterized appellant's conduct
and bearing as a "little bit unsteady," but
he did not stumble. His speech was either
"slightly slurred" or "slightly slow
speech." At times appellant appeared confused, but was at all times courteous and
cooperative. Appellant stipulated that his
blood alcohol reading was .152 shortly after his arrest, and the degree of his intoxication was not an issue at trial, nor is it an
issue on appeal.
Appellant was charged with being in "actual physical control" of a motor vehicle
while in an intoxicated condition which rendered him incapable of safely operating
such vehicle. He was charged with violating § 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977, 1983 Cum.
Supp.:
"It is unlawful for any person who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle,
to drive or have actual physical control of
any vehicle within this state." l
Appellant was tried by the Honorable
Stephen E. Davidson, Natrona County
Judge, sitting without a jury, and found
guilty. His conviction was affirmed by the
district court sitting as an intermediate appellate court.
I
[1] Appellant contends that the words
"actual physical control," contained in
§ 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977, are unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. He did not
designate a constitutional issue on appeal,
nor was it raised in the courts below. Appellant merely states in his brief that the
statute is unconstitutional but he cites no
authority. We have not had an occasion to
consider the constitutionality of § 31-51. Now § 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977 (November

233(a). However, other states have addressed the constitutional challenge that j s
now before us.
In 1-956, Montana had a provision in its
statute which utilized the term "actual
physical control" in almost the identical
manner as involved here. See § 32-2142(1)
subd. (a) R.C.M.1947. The Montana Supreme Court held that the statute was "neither vague nor uncertain." State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958).
The court stated:
" * * * Using the term in 'actual physical control' in its composite sense, it
means 'existing' or 'present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or
regulation.' Thus, if a person has existing or present bodily restraint, directing
influence, domination, or regulation, of
an automobile, while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor he commits a misdemeanor within the provisions of [the
statute].
[2] In arriving at the above definition,
the Montana court interpreted the words
"actual," "physical," and "control" in their
ordinary meaning. This is consistent with
the general rule that words of a statute are
to be interpreted in their ordinary, everyday sense unless a contrary interpretation
is indicated in the specific statute. Wyoming State Department of Education v.
Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982).
We are satisfied with the Montana Supreme Court's definition of "actual physical
control," and are persuaded that such definition is applicable to the Wyoming statute.
We hold, therefore, that § 31-5-233(a),
W.S.1977, is not unconstitutional because
of vagueness or ambiguity. See also Parker v. State, Okla.Crim.App., 424 P.2d 997
(1967).
II
[3] Before 1981, § 31-5-233(a), W.S.
1977, made it an offense for anyone, who
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, to
1984 Replacement).
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drive any vehicle within the state. The
legislature amended the statute in 1981.
The word "drive" was retained, and the
words "or have actual physical control of"
were added in the disjunctive. Ch. 12, S.L.
of Wyoming, 1981.
We conclude that the legislature intended that the present law cover factual situations not covered by the earlier statute, and
more particularly, that the legislature intended that the law should apply to persons
having control of a vehicle while not actually driving it or having it in motion. The
new statute defines two different offenses,
"driving a vehicle" while intoxicated and
"having actual physical control of a vehicle" while intoxicated.
Appellant contends that there was no
"actual physical control" under the circumstances of this case, that is, the vehicle
lights were off, the engine was not running, the ignition key was in an "off position, and the vehicle was off the road.
Appellant cites the following cases to support his contention. Key v. Town of Kinsey, Ala.Crim.App., 424 So.2d 701 (1982);
State v. Zavala, 136 Ariz. 356, 666 P.2d 456
(1983); Garcia v. Schwendiman, Utah, 645
P.2d 651 (1982); State v. Bugger, 25 Utah
2d 404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971).
Other jurisdictions have held otherwise,
and we believe their determination more
nearly comports with Wyoming public policy. The controlling facts in Hughes v.
State, Okla.Crim., 535 P.2d 1023 (1975), are
almost identical to the facts in the case
here. In Hughes, the keys were merely in
the ignition and the accused was unconscious behind the wheel of his parked car.2
The Oklahoma court found the accused to
be in "actual physical control" of an automobile.3 The court there said:
" * * * We believe that an intoxicated
person seated behind the steering wheel
of a motor vehicle is a threat to the
safety and welfare of the public. The
danger is less than where an intoxicated
2. We learn some of the details of Hughes from
Mason v. State, Okla.Crim., 603 P.2d 1146
(1979).
697 P 2d—15

person is actually driving a vehicle, but it
does exist. The defendant when arrested may have been exercising no conscious violation with regard to the vehicle, still there is a legitimate inference to
be drawn that he placed himself behind
the wheel of the vehicle and could have
at any time started the automobile and
driven away. He therefore had 'actual
physical control' of the vehicle within the
meaning of the statute. * * * " Id., at
1024.
An intoxicated person seated behind the
steering wheel of an automobile is a threat
to the safety and welfare of the public.
The danger is less than that involved when
the vehicle is actually moving; however,
the danger does exist and the degree of
danger is only slightly less than when the
vehicle is moving. As long as a person is
physically or bodily able to assert dominion
in the sense of movement by starting the
car and driving away, then he has substantially as much control over the vehicle as
he would if he were actually driving it.
State v. Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338
(1954); and State v. Ruona, supra.
[4] We believe that the legislative intent in enacting the "actual physical control" portion of § 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977, is
apprehending the intoxicated driver before
he can do any harm by operating a motor
vehicle. Mason v. State, Okla.Crim., 603
P.2d 1146 (1979); and Hughes v. State,
supra. Furthermore, the statute is indicative of public policy of the State of Wyoming to discourage intoxicated persons
from making any attempt to enter a vehicle
except as passengers or passive occupants.
Garcia v. Schwendiman, supra.
[5] We believe there was sufficient evidence in this case to support the trial
court's finding that appellant was "in actual physical control" of his vehicle at the
time of his arrest.
Affirmed.
3. The applicable Oklahoma statute was 47 O.S.
§ 11-902, which in pertinent part, is almost
identical to § 31-5-233(a), W.S.1977.
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Amado B. GARCIA, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief of Dm
ers License Division, State of Utah,
Defendant and Respondent.
No. 17559.
Suprt me Court of I Hal
April 1 1<N>
Motorist appealed from an order of the
Second District Court, Davis County, Douglas L. Cornaby, J., affirming the Department of Public Safety's administrative revocation of his driving privileges under the
implied consent statute. The Supreme
Court, Durham, J., held that where the
motorist occupied the driver's position behind the steering wheel of an automobile,
with possession of the ignition key and with
the apparent ability to start and move the
vehicle, he had "actual physical control"
under the implied consent statute, even
though he might have been prevented from
moving the vehicle by a fence in front and t
parked car in the rear.
Affirmed.
1 \utomobiles 0=^144.2(9, 10)
Showing that arresting officer had
grounds to believe that person was in physical control of vehicle is not by itself sufficient to support administrative license revocation for refusal to submit to blood test,
but Department of Public Safety must
show that operator was in actual physical
control of motor vehicle in addition to showing that arresting officer had grounds to
believe that operator was then under influence of alcohol; same burdens must be met
in district court de novo review, U C.A.
1953, 41-6-44.10(b)
!

\utomobiles ®=> 144.2(10)
In contrast to prosecutions under criini
nal statutes, driver's license revocation proceeding requires proof only by preponder-

ance of evidence and not bevond reasonable
doubt IT C A 1953, 41 6-44.10(b).
3. Appeal and Error e » 1009(1, JI
Standard for appellate review of factuil findings affords great deference to trial
court's view of evidence unless trial court
has misapplied law or its findings are clearly against weight of evidence.
1 \utomobiles <3=>144.1(1)
"Actual physical control" language of
implied consent statute should !>e read as
intending to prevent intoxicated drivers
from entering their vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants. I T A 195,],
41-G-44.10(a).
See publication Words and Phr ises
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
5. Automobiles 0=144.1(1)
Where motorist occupied driver's position behind steering wheel of automobile,
with possession of ignition key and with
apparent ability to start and move vehicle,
he had "actual physical control" under implied consent statute, even though he might
have been prevented from moving vehicle
by fence in front and parked car in rear
U.C.A.1953, 41-e-44.1(Xa).
6. Automobiles <*= 144.1(1)
Fact that motorist occupying drivers
position in automobile might be physically
obstructed from driving away does not preclude license revocation under implied consent statute. U f \ 19">3, 41 f> 4 4 10(a)
7. Automobiles c=111.2((n
To obtain license revocation under implied consent statute, Department of Public
Safety need not show that motorist actually
intended to exert "actual physical control"
over vehicle. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(a).

Richard \\ Hrann, U^deii, toi [ilunlitl
and appellant
I) i\id L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M.
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
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DURHAM, Justice:
After a trial de novo, the district court
affirmed the defendant's administrate e
revocation of plaintiff Garcia's driving privileges. Plaintiff appeals from~the district
court decision and contends that there was
insufficient evidence to support the district
court's finding that he was in "actual physical control of a motor vehicle" as contemplated by the Utah implied consent statute.
At 6:00 p. m. on November 1, 1980, Officer Gerald Ecker responded to a distur
bance complaint at an apartment complex
in Sunset, Utah. When he arrived at the
complex, Officer Ecker was met by a Mr.
Varble, who had positioned his own vehicle
behind the automobile of the plaintiff to
prevent the plaintiff from backing out of
his parking stall. A fence was located approximately three feet in front of the plaintiffs car. Officer Ecker testified that as he
approached the Garcia vehicle, he observed
the plaintiff alone in the vehicle behind the
steering wheel in the "process of starting
his motor vehicle" by attempting to turn on
the ignition; the officer testified that he
saw the keys in the ignition. While there
was some dispute about whether or not the
key was actually in the ignition, the district
court found it "believable that the plaintiff
had the keys in the ignition," and it is not
disputed that he had the ignition key in his
exclusive possession. Officer Ecker observed that plaintiff was apparently under
the influence of alcohol. A second police
officer, Officer Gale, arrived at the scene,
obtained the keys from the plaintiff and,
after interviewing Officer Ecker and Mr.
Varble, placed the plaintiff under arrest for
being in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol
The plaintiff refused to permit chemical
tests of his blood or breath, and consequently received a one-year revocation of his
driver's license after an administrative
hearing by the Department of Public Safety
pursuant to the authority of the Utah implied consent statute, § 41-6-44.10, Utah
Code Ann. (1953). This statute provides for
revocation of a person's driver's license
when he refuses to submit to chemical tests

of his blood, breath or urine "for the purpose of determining whether he was driving
or in ulual physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol." _The statute's enforcement provision,
§ 41-^6-44.10(b) U 0 A , requires that the
arresting officer have reasonable grounds
to believe that the arrested person has been
driving or is in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle whilp undor the influence of
alcohol.
[1] The defendant argues that a showing that the arresting officer had grounds
to believe the person was in physical control
of a vehicle is by itself sufficient to support
an administrative license revocation. We
disagree. This Court has previously recognized two separate evidentiary burdens to
be borne by the Department of Public Safety in a revocation proceeding The department must show that an operator was "in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle"
in addition to showing that the arresting
officer had grounds to believe that the operator was then under the influence of alcohol. Ballard v. State, Utah, 595 P.2d 1302
(1979)
[2] The same burdens must be met in
the district court. The district court's jurisdiction, conferred by § 41-&-44.10(b)
U.C.A., is limited to a trial de novo "to
determine whether the petitioner's license is
subject to revocation under the provisions
of this act." In Ballard, supra, we characterized the trial de novo as "civil and administrative, the purpose of which is for the
protection of the public." 595 P.2d at 1304.
In contrast to prosecutions under criminal
statutes, a license revocation proceeding requires proof only by a preponderance of the
evidence and not beyond a reasonable
doubt. Since all other matters were resolved by stipulation, the single issue before
the district court, and now before us, is
whether the defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
was "in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle" its contemplated by the implied
consent statute.
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[iij I he district court iound u from the
totality of the facts and the circumstances
that the [plaintiff] had actual physical control of the vehicle as required by the Implied Consent Statute." The standard for
appellate review of factual findings affords
great deference to the trial court's view of
the evidence unless the trial court has misapplied the law or its findings are clearly
against the weight of the evidence. Pagano v. Walker, Utah, 539 P.2d 452 (1975);
Reed v. Alvey, Utah, 610 P.2d 1374 (1980).
The meaning of "actual physical control"
is suggested by the structure of § 41-6 It
10(a), which reads:
Any person operating a motor \ t h i c k in
this state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test or tests . . .
for the purpose of determining whether
he was driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol . . . .
[Emphasis
added.]
The u *' of the disjunctive "or" strongly
suggests an intent to proscribe conduct beyond and different from driving or operating a moving vehicle.1 Thus, the standard
in Utah for determining whether a person
was "in actual physical control" of a vehicle
is different from the standard used in
states which have only "driving" or "operating" language in their statutes. State v.
Daly, 64 N.J. 122, 313 A.2d 194 (1973), for
example, relied upon by plaintiff, was decided under a criminal statute with "operating" language and is not persuasive in this
case. Of greater value is the case of State
v. Ruona, Mont., 321 P.2d 615 (1958), in
which the Montana Supreme Court, following an earlier Ohio case, construed a criminal statute with the phrase "drive or be in
actual physical control," and adopted the
view that:
. . . the statute defined two distinct offenses, in "operating a vehicle," and "being in actual physical control of a vehicle"
while intoxicated.
1. As of 1967, § 41-6-44.10(a) U.C.A. simply"
stated that "any person operating a motor vehicle" was deemed to have given his consent to
chemical tests. In 1969, a new subparagraph
(b) was enacted which referred to tests "for the
purpose of determining whether he was driving

321 P.2d at 618. This conclusion was likewise reached in Walker v. State, Okl.Cr.,
424 P.2d 1001 (1967), where the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the use
of the disjunctive in Oklahoma's statute
resulted in two offenses, one being "to
drive or operate" and the other being "to be
in actual physical control" of a motor vehicle. The language of Utah's implied consent statute requires the same construction.
A definition of "actual physical control"
is contained in State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d
404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971). The statute in
question there was § 41-6-44, which made
it unlawful for any person under th» influence of intoxicating liquor "to drive or be in
actual physical control of any vehicle within
this state." In Bugger, the defendant was
found asleep in his car, which was completely off the traveled portion of the highway;
the motor was not running. This Court
held that there was no actual physical control of the vehicle. "Actual physical control" was defined in its ordinary sense to
mean "present bodily restraint, directing
influence, domination or regulation." 483
P.2d at 443. The Court found, on these
facts, that the defendant was "not controlling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any
dominion over it " Id.
Acts short of starting the motor have
been held to constitute actual physical control in other jurisdictions. In Hughes v.
State, Okl.Cr., 535 P.2d 1023 (1975), the
court found a defendant to have been in
actual physical control of a vehicle when
the vehicle was found improperly parked in
a residential area. The defendant was in
the front seat, the ignition key was in the
ignition, and the motor was turned off.
The court said:
IL is our opinion that the legislature, in
making it a crime to be in "actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor," inor was in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle under the influence ...,*' which is the
same language found in the current statute.
Thus, the Legislature appears to have deliberately expanded the scope of the statute's coverage.
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tended to enable the drunken driver to be
apprehended before he strikes . . . .

[T]he term "actual physical control," as
employed in the subject ordinance, requires that a person be in the driver's
seat of a vehielo, IK hind the steering
wheel, in possession of the ignition key,
and in such condition that he is physically
capable of starting the engine and
causing the vehicle to move.

We believe that_an intoxicated person
seated behind the steering wheel of a
motor vehicle is a threat to the safety
and welfare of the public. The danger is
less than when the intoxicated person is
actually driving a vehicle, but it does
351 N.E.2d at 87. That a preventive purexist. The defendant when arrested may
pose should be read into the "actual physihave been exercising no conscious volition
cal
control" language is the opinion of a
wdth regard to the vehicle, still there is a
substantial
majority of the jurisdictions inlegitimate inference to be drawn that he
terpreting
similar
statutory language.2
placed himself behind the wheel of the
vehicle and could have at any time startIn a recent case, State v. Juncewski,
ed the automobile and driven away.
Minn., 308 N.W.2d 316 (1981), the Supreme
535 P.2d at 1024. The same public policy Court of Minnesota held that a defendant
concern for prevention compelled a similar who had been found inside a pickup truck,
result in City of Cincinnati v. Kelley, 47 seated behind and leaning against the steerOhio St.2d 94,1 Ohio Ops. 56, 351 N.E.2d 85 ing wrheel was in "actual physical control"
(1976). In that case an intoxicated motorist of the vehicle. While there was uncertainseated in the driver's seat of a legally
ty as to whether the motor was running,
parked car with his hands on the steering
the court held that "[w]hether a motor
wheel and the keys in the ignition was
must be running before a person may be in
found to be in actual physical control of his
actual
physical control is essentially a policy
vehicle, even though the engine was off.
issue."
308 N.W.2d at 320.
The court held that the relevant city ordinance provided for two separate offenses, in
[4,5] As a matter of public policy and
that it prohibited "operating or being in
statutory
construction, we believe that the
'actual physical control* of a vehicle while
"actual
physical
control" language of
under the influence of alcohol." (Emphasis
Utah's
implied
consent
statute should be
in original.) From that initial premise, the
read
as
intending
to
prevent
intoxicated
court concluded that it should interpret the
drivers
from
entering
their
vehicles
except
"control" offense in light of the apparent
as
passengers
or
passive
occupants
as in
legislative purpose in defining an offense
Bugger, supra. Therefore, under the facts
separate from "operating."
The clear purpose of the control aspect of before us, where a motorist occupied the
the instant ordinance is to deter persons driver's position behind the steering wheel,
from being found under circumstances in with possession of the ignition key and with
which they can directly commence operat- the apparent ability to start and move the
ing a vehicle while they are under the vehicle,3 we hold that there has been an
influence of alcohol
adequate showing of "actual physical con*
*
*
*
*
*
trol" under our implied consent statute.
2. See, e.g., State v. Ghylm, N.D., 250 N.W.2d 3. The testimony of Officer Ecker was that
252 (1977) (purpose of statute to deter intoxiplaintiff had the key in the ignition and "was in
cated persons from getting into their vehicle
the process of starting his motor vehicle." He
except as passengers); State v. Beckey, 291
later expressed the view that the plaintiff was
Minn. 483, 192 N.W.2d 441 (1971) (purpose of
having trouble doing so because of the degree
implied consent law to aid enforcement of
of his intoxication, but nothing in the record
criminal drunk driving statute); State v. Halwarrants a finding that the plaintiff was physivorson, Minn., 181 N.W.2d 473 (1970) (purpose
cally unable to start the car, as would be the
to promote traffic safety); State v. Schuler,
case with an unconscious or sleeping motorist.
N.D., 243 N.W.2d 367 (1976) (purpose of "actual physical control" statute is preventive)
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[6] That the plaintiff might have been
prevented from moving his vehicle by the
fence in front and the parked car of Mr.
Varble in the rear does not alter our conclusion. In that respect, our decision comports
with cases from other jurisdictions in which
there was a physical obstacle preventing
actual movement of the vehicle, but the
courts nonetheless found actual physical
control.4 The record in this case demonstrates that plaintiff's automobile could
have traveled at least a few feet if it had
been put into operation.
[7] Similarly, we find it unnecessary l*nr
the department to show actual intent under
the control provisions of the implied consent
statute. Just as an intent to drive is inferred from one's actual driving, so also
may an intent to control a vehicle be inferred from the performance of those acts
which we have held to constitute aetu il
physical control.
The decision of tin di trirt ounl I ilfirmed.
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, OAKS and
HOWE, JJ., concur.
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Q Ford WILSON and Marilee W. Wilson,
et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
\.
A Lin B. MANNING, City Recorder, ( it)
ill Fruit Heights, Defendant and
Respondent.
No. 17632.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 1, 1982.
Petitioners brought action for a writ of
mandamus commanding a city recorder to
4. See, e.g., State v. Dunbany, 184 Neb. 337, 167
N.W.2d 556 (1969); State v. Schuler, N.D., 243

submit a rezoning ordinance to a referendum. The Second District Court, Davis
County, Thornley K. Swan, J., denied the
petition, and appeal was taken. The Supreme Court held that an unsigned minute
entry did not constitute an entry of judgment, nor was it final judgment for purposes of applicable rules governing appeals.
Appeal dismissed.

\|)pt'.'tl tind Error c=-7S(l)
An unsigned minute entry denying petition for writ of mandamus did not constitute an entry of judgment, nor was it final
judgment for purposes of applicable rules
governing appeals. Rules Civ Proc , Rules
58A(b, c), 72(a).

( urtis ,1 Drake, Salt Lake Cit\, f<u plaintiffs and appellants,
l
D. Kent Norton, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners brought this action for a writ
of mandamus commanding a city recorder
to submit a rezoning ordinance to a referendum. The district court denied the petition
in an unsigned minute entry accompanied
by a certificate of mailing which directed
counsel for the defendant to prepare an
order conforming to the minute entry.
However, no order appears in the record
and apparently none was entered. The notice of appeal states that petitioners appeal
"from the minute entry entered in this action
An unsigned minute entry does not constitute an entry of judgment, nor is it a
final judgment for purposes of Utah
R.Civ.P. 72(a). Utah R.Civ.P. 58A(b) and
(c); Steadman v. Lake Hills, 20 Utah 2d 61,
433.P.2d 1 (1967); Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135
N W.2d 367 (IM76).
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under influence of intoxicating liquor.
Okl.St.Ann. § 11-902.

47

The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
No. M-75-174.

Court of Criminal Appeals oi < >M ihoni i.
May 13, 1975.
Rehearing Denied June 5, 1975.

Defendant was comicted in the District Court, Cherokee County, Lynn Burns,
J., of actual physical control of motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating
liquor, and he appealed. The Court of
Criminal Appeals, Bussey, J., held that
where defendant, when arrested, was behind the wheel and could have at any time
started it and driven away, he had "actual
physical control" of automobile within statute proscribing actual physical control of
motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor and that evidence sustained conviction.
Affirmed.

!

A u t o m o b i l e s C=332

Legislature, in making it a crime to be
in "actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor," intended to enable police to apprehend the drunken driver before he
strikes. 47 Okl.St.Ann. § 11-902.
/

A u t o m o b i l e s 0=^332

Where defendant, when arrested, was
behind the wheel of car and could have at
any time started it and driven away, he
had "actual physical control" of automobile
within statute proscribing actual physical
control of motor vehicle while under influence of intoxicating liquor. 47 Okl.St.Ann.
§ 11-902.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Automobiles C=>355(6)
Evidence sustained conviction of actual physical control of motor vehicle while

An appeal from the District Court,
Cherokee County; Lynn Burns, Judge.
Charles Hughes, appellant, was convicted
of the offeiTse of Actual Physical Control
of a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor; was sentenced to thirty (30) days in the County
Jail and fined in the amount of One Hundred ($100.00) dollars, and appeals. Judgment and sentence affirmed.
John T. Lawson, Tahlequah, for appellant.
Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., Michael
Jackson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
OPINION
BUSSEY, Judge:
Appellant, Charles Hughes, hereinafter
referred to as defendant, was charged,
tried and convicted in the District Court,
Cherokee County, Case No. CRM-73-3S9,
for the crime of Actual Physical Control
of a Motor Vehicle While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor (47 O.S. §
11-902). His punishment was fixed at a
term of thirty (30) days in the County jail
and a fine of One Hundred ($100.00) dollars. From said judgment and sentence, a
timely appeal has been perfected to this
Court.
Briefly stated, the facts are that on September 3, 1973, at approximately 9:00 p.
m , Don Fields, a trooper for the Oklahoma Highway Patrol, was called to investigate an improperly parked vehicle in the
Sharon Hills Addition of Cherokee County.
Upon arriving at the scene, he observed a
1972 Buick, white over gold, sitting at a 90
degree angle on the roadway. He observed two people in the automobile. The
deiendant-^was situated, in the front seat
with his feet on the front floorboard underneath the steering wheel and his head
was down leaning towards the passenger
side of the automobile. Trooper Fields

1 0 2 4 Okl.

535 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

gained entry to the vehicle by arousing the
defendant's son who was asleep in the back
seat. The ignition key was in the ignition.
After arousing the_ defendant,^Trooper
Fields observed that the defendant was unstable on his feet, his speech was slurred,
his eyes were bloodshot, and he smelled
"very strong of alcoholic beverage." In
Trooper Fields' opinion the defendant was
very intoxicated.
The defendant did not take the stand nor
offer any evidence in his behalf.
Defendant's sole assignment of error asserts that the evidence presented in this
case was wholly insufficient to support a
conviction of the crime of Actual Physical
Control of a Motor Vehicle While Under
the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor.
In the case of Parker v. State, Okl.Cr.,
424 P.2d 997 (1967), this Court held in
Syllabi two and three:
"2. Actual physical control, as used in
Title 47 O.S.A. § ll-902(a), means: existing or present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation
of any automobile, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
"3. If a person has existing or present
bodily restraining, directing influence,
domination or regulation of an automobile, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, he commits an offense
within the provisions of the statute."
In the case of State v. Wilgus, Ohio
Com.Pl, 17 Ohio Supp. 34 (1954), in
which the Ohio Supreme Court was
construing a statute similar to the instant
statute, that court held that the statute defined two distinct offenses, "operating a
vehicle," and "being in actual physical control of a vehicle" while intoxicated. The
court further held that the control contemplated meant more than the "ability to stop
an automobile," but meant the "ability to
keep from starting," "to hold in subjection," "to exercise directing influence
over," and "the authority to manage."

[1] It is our opinion that the legislature, in making it a crime to be in "actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor,"
intended to enable the drunken driver to be
apprehended before he strikes. As was
stated in the case of State v. Harold, 74
Ariz. 210, 246 P.2d 178 (1952):
" . . . It appears to us to be even
more important for the legislature to
prevent operators of cars who are under
the influence of intoxicating liquors or
who are at the time driving recklessly
and in wilful and wanton disregard for
the safety of persons or property, from
entering upon the highways and into the
stream of traffic than to permit them to
enter thereon and after a tragic accident
has happened to punish them for maiming or causing the death of those who
are lawfully in the use of such highways.

[2,3] We believe that an intoxicated
person seated behind the steering wheel of
a motor vehicle is a threat to the safety
and welfare of the public. The danger is
less than where an intoxicated person is
actually driving a vehicle, but it does exist.
The defendant when arrested may have
been exercising no conscious violation with
regard to the vehicle, still there is a legitimate inference to be drawn that he placed
himself behind the wheel of the vehicle
and could have at any time started the automobile and driven away. He therefore
had "actual physical control" of the vehicle
within the meaning of the statute. We,
therefore, find there was sufficient competent evidence to support the verdict.
Finding no error sufficient to warrant
modification or reversal, it is our opinion
that the judgment and sentence appealed
from should be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.
BRETT, P. J. and BLISS, J., concur.
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consider whether and under what circumstances recusal may be required in administrative adjudications when the specific provisions of section 54=7-1.5 do-jiot apply.Plainly, having participated in a rule making proceeding does not automatically preclude a commissioner from participating in
a later, properly conducted adjudication.
We have considered the other issues
raised and find their disposition unnecessary to the result. The Commission's rule
is of no force and effect, and its order is
vacated. The matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

whose vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble, and (2) driver's refusal to submit to breath test upon
rumors that there had been incidents of
tampering with breathalyzer in the past
was nevertheless refusal, subjecting defendant to license revocation.
Affirmed.
1. Automobiles <s=>144.2(9)
In revocation proceeding, Driver Division has burden to show that operator of
vehicle was in actual physical control of
motor vehicle and that arresting officer
had grounds to believe that operator was
under influence of alcohol.
2. Automobiles <3>144.2( 10)
In trial de novo, district court must
determine by preponderance of evidence
whether driver's license was subject to revocation for driving under the influence of
alcohol. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10.

Jose Antonio LOPEZ, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
Fred C. SCHWENDIMAN, Chief, Driver
License Services, Utah Department of
Public Safety, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 20112.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 12, 1986.
Utah State Driver License Division revoked driving privileges of driver for period of one year. The Seventh District
Court, Carbon County, Richard C. Davidson, J., affirmed the administrative decision. Driver appealed. The Supreme
Court, held that: (1) statute providing for
arrest of one "in actual physical control" of
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol
and/or drugs was intended by legislature
to protect public safety and apprehend
drunken driver before he or she strikes and
may not be construed to exclude those

3. Automobiles <2>144.2(3)
Supreme Court's review of district
court's determination as to whether driver's license was subject to revocation for
driving while under the influence of alcohol
is deferential to trial court's view of evidence unless trial court has misapplied
principles of law or its findings are clearly
against weight of evidence.
4. Automobiles C=>144.1(1)
Even if truck was inoperable at time
that licensee was found sleeping in it and
arrested, that would not preclude him from
having "actual physical control" over truck
so that his driver's license could be revoked
if he had statutorily prohibited blood alcohol content. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.10(1, 2).
5. Automobiles <s=>349
Statute providing for arrest of one "in
actual physical control" of vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs
was intended by legislature to protect public safety and apprehend drunken driver
before he or she strikes and may not be
construed to exclude those vehicles are
presently immobile because of mechanical
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trouble.
10(2).

U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19.5, 41-6-44.-

6. Automobiles @=*144.2(10)
District court's findings that vehicle
had reached its point of rest under its own
power and that licensee had failed field
sobriety test, were supported by competent
evidence, and would not be disturbed by
Supreme Court.
7. Automobiles <s=*144.1(l)
Refusal to take breathalyzer test simply means that arrestee was asked to take
breath test decline to do so of his own
volition.
8. Automobiles <3=>144.2(8)
Whether or not driver's refusal to take
breath test is conditional or reasonable
makes no difference; result is still license
revocation of one year. U.C.A.1953, 41-644.10.
9. Automobiles <S>144.1(1)
Refusal to answer yes or no to request
to taking breath test is still refusal, for
purpose of license revocation. U.C.A.
1953, 41-6-44.10.
10. Automobiles <3=>144.1(1)
Driver's licensee admitted that he had
been requested to submit to breath test
and that he had refused, invoking sanction
of revocation of his license. U.C.A.1953,
41-6-44.10.
11. Appeal and Error <3>181
Supreme Court will not review alleged
error when no objection at all is made at
trial level.
Phil L. Hansen, (Lopez), Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and appellant.
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Bruce M.
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for
defendant and respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The Utah State Driver License Division
revoked the driving privileges of petitioner
Lopez for a period of one year pursuant to
U.C.A., 1953, § 41-6-44.10 (1981 ed.). Af-

ter a trial de novo, the trial court affirmed
the administrative decision. Lopez appeals
and contends: (1) it was error to find that
Lopez was in actual physical control of his
vehicle when he was asleep at the wheel
and the vehicle was inoperable; (2) his refusal to take a breath test was reasonable;
and (3) it was error to allow testimony on
Lopez's breath test refusal when Lopez did
not know that he was under arrest. We
affirm.
At approximately 3:00 a.m. on March 18,
1984, Officers Anderson and Schofield
were separately dispatched to investigate a
prowler report. En route, Schofield was
flagged down by an individual who pointed
to Lopez's truck parked by a public telephone booth adjacent to Sunnyside City
Hall. The truck's motor was not running.
There were vehicle tracks from the pickup
in the freshly fallen snow. When Schofield
approached the truck, Lopez was sitting in
the driver's seat with his head resting on
the steering wheel. Schofield tapped on
the window, assisted Lopez in opening the
door to talk to him, and had to catch him
when he fell more than stepped out of his
truck. Schofield smelled alcohol on Lopez's breath. Lopez was drooling, had
very poor balance, and needed support to
stand. When asked to produce a driver
license, Lopez initially handed the officer a
child's picture. Schofield removed the keys
from the ignition and had to turn them to
get them out.
After Officer Anderson arrived, both officers asked Lopez to perform several field
sobriety tests, which he failed. Lopez at
one point stated, "Was I driving, I was just
waiting for a phone call." Lopez was
placed under arrest, handcuffed, and
placed in the patrol car. Both officers testified that Lopez asked several times what
he was arrested for. Officer Anderson
then requested Lopez to submit to a breath
test to determine the alcohol content in his
blood. ~"Lopez responded, "I took your
tests. I passed your tests." Lopez was
transported to the sheriff's station, where
he was again asked to submit to the breath
test, was advised that he would be permit-
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ted to have an additional test administered
by a physician of his own choice, and was
warned that his refusal to submit to the
test could result in revocation of -his license
for one year. Lopez did not respond.
At trial, Lopez stated for the first time
that his wife had been driving the truck
when the battery died. He had been waiting in the truck for her to bring the car to
tow the truck home. He admitted that he
had not told the officers about any dead
battery or dead car. He admitted that he
understood that he had been arrested for
driving while under the influence. Lopez
also testified that he had refused the officer's request to take the breath test because he "didn't trust them" and that he
had conducted the field sobriety tests well
enough to prove that he had not been
drinking. He also confirmed that he had
been told that he would lose his license if
he refused.
From the evidence so adduced, the trial
court found by a preponderance that there
was probable cause to arrest Lopez, that he
had been requested to take the breath test,
and that he had been warned of the consequences if there was a refusal. The court
found the arrest proper because Lopez was
alone in the car, had the keys to the vehicle, "there were tire tracks leading up to
the vehicle, the vehicle got there apparently on its own power," and Lopez had failed
the field sobriety tests.
[1-3] In a revocation proceeding, the
Driver License Division has the burden to
show that the operator of a vehicle was "in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle"
and that the arresting officer had grounds
to believe that the operator was then under
the influence of alcohol. Garcia v.
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652 (Utah
1982); Ballard v. State, 595 P.2d 1302
(Utah 1979). In a trial de novo, the district
court must determine by a preponderance
of the evidence "whether the petitioner's
license is subject to revocation under the
provisions of this chapter." § 41-6-44.10(2), supra; Garcia, 645 P.2d at 652. Our
review of that determination is deferential
to the trial court's view of the evidence

unless the trial court has misapplied principles of law or its findings are clearly
against the weight of the evidence. Id. at
653. _
Lopez first argues that the Driver License Division failed to meet the statutory
requirements that he had "actual physical
control" of the vehicle when he was arrested. Section 41-6-44.10(1) reads in pertinent part:
Any person operating a motor vehicle in
this state shall be deemed to have given
his consent to a chemical test or tests of
his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining whether he was driving or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or
while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or combination of alcohol and any
drug . . . so long as the test is or tests
are administered at the direction of a
peace officer having grounds to believe
that person to have been driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug
Lopez compares his situation to the facts
of State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483
P.2d 442 (1971), where the driver of the
vehicle had parked his car completely off
the road, had turned off the motor, and
was sleeping. Nothing in that case indicates that the driver was in the driver's
seat at the time he was found and arrested.
"Positioning in the driver's seat is an element common to all of the cases that have
found actual physical control of a motionless vehicle." State v. Smelter, 36 Wash.
App. 439, 674 P.2d 690 (1984). See also
Adams v. State, 697 P.2d 622 (Wyo.1985);
Huges v. State, 535 P.2d 1023 (Okla.Crim.
1975); but compare Bearden v. State, 430
P.2d 844 (Okla.Crim.1967), where the driver
lay unconscious on the ground beside his
pickup truck. The courts upholding convictions in these and similar fact situations
start out from the premise that as long as
a person is physically able to assert domin-
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ion by starting the car and driving away,
he has substantially as much control over
the vehicle as he would if he were actually
driving it. Adams v. State, 697 P.2d at
625.
[4,5] Nonetheless, Lopez claims that
his car was inoperable at the time of his
arrest and that the statutory burden was
therefore not borne by the Driver License
Division as he was unable to start the car
and drive it away. We note initially that
Lopez first told this version of the events
leading to his arrest when he took the
stand in his trial de novo. No substantiating evidence was offered to buttress his
assertion. Under the circumstances, the
trial court may well have disbelieved him
and given little weight to his testimony.
Assuming arguendo that Lopez's truck
was indeed disabled, jurisdictions with similar statutes as ours have nonetheless
found "actual physical control" of the driver over the disabled car. The rationale was
forcefully voiced in State v. Smelter, 674
P.2d at 693:
The focus should not be narrowly upon
the mechanical condition of the car when
it comes to rest, but upon the status of
its occupant and the nature of the authority he or she exerted over the vehicle
in arriving at the place from which, by
virtue of its inoperability, it can no longer move. Where, as here, circumstantial
evidence permits a legitimate inference
that the car was where it was and was
performing as it was because of the defendant's choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical control.
To hold otherwise could conceivably allow an intoxicated driver whose vehicle
was rendered inoperable in a collision to
escape prosecution.
Citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 237 Pa.
Super.212, 352 A.2d 137 (1975). Utah's
statute provides for the arrest of one "in
actual physical control" of the vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol and/or
drugs. That requirement was intended by
our legislature to protect public safety and
apprehend the drunken driver before he or
she strikes, § 41-2-19.5; Garcia, 645 P.2d

at 654; accord Ballard v. State, supra,
and may not be construed to exclude those
whose vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble. State v.
Smelter, supra.
[6] The trial court here found that
there were tire tracks leading up to the
vehicle, that the vehicle had to have
reached its point of rest "apparently on its
own power," and that Lopez had failed the
field sobriety tests. Those findings are
supported by competent evidence and will
not be disturbed by this Court.
[7-10] At trial, Lopez based his refusal
to submit to a breath test upon the rumors
that there had been incidents of tampering
with the breathalyzer in the past. His
retort to the officers at the scene was that
he had taken the tests and passed them. A
refusal simply means that an arrestee who
is asked to take a breath test "declines to
do so of his own volition." Cavaness v.
Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). Whether or
not that refusal is conditional makes no
difference. Id. Likewise, it makes no difference whether or not a refusal is reasonable. The result is still a license revocation
of one year. By the same token, a refusal
to answer yes or no to a request to take a
breath test is still a refusal. Beck v. Cox,
597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979). Lopez admitted
that he had been requested to submit to the
test and that he had refused. No more
was required to invoke the sanction of the
statute. § 41-6-44.10(2), supra.
[11] We do not reach the merits of Lopez's claim that testimony on his refusal to
take the breath test was inadmissible because he was not aware that he was under
arrest. Lopez's counsel did not object, but
actively solicited that testimony from Lopez on cross-examination. This Court will
not review alleged error when no objection
at all is made at the trial level. State v.
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983).
The judgment is affirmed.
(O
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arm or knife and retained only the general
term "dangerous weapon," Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302(l)(a) (Supp.1989), as do the statutes setting forth the elements of other
"aggravated" crimes, e.g., Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-103 (Supp.1989) (aggravated assault); Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (Supp.
1989) (aggravated burglary). We agree
with the State that this change to conform
the language of the aggravated robbery
statute evinces the legislature's intent that
the sentence enhancement provision apply
uniformly to all aggravated crimes, including aggravated robbery.
Although it is unclear why the legislature amended section 76-6-302(1 )(a) in 1975
to add the specific term "firearm" to the
aggravated robbery statute, since robbery
committed with a firearm was already covered by the general term "deadly weapon"
retained in the subsection, we conclude that
the amendment created no ambiguity over
what penalty the legislature intended for
robbery committed with a firearm. The
legislature was merely increasing the degree of a robbery committed with the enumerated instruments of violence. In its
subsequent adoption of the enhancement
provision for firearm use in the commission
of a first degree felony, the legislature
exercised its authority to determine that,
because firearms are more dangerous than
knives or other deadly weapons, their use
was more deserving of enhanced punishment See Angus, 581 P.2d at 994-95.
Finally, Webb asserts that, even if the
enhancement provisions of section 76-3203(1) are applicable to his aggravated robbery conviction, the trial court erroneously
imposed a total of six years as the term of
enhancement. Based on the Utah Supreme
Court's interpretation of the firearm enhancement statute as providing for a maximum enhancement term of five years,
State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 1984),
the State concedes that the trial court erroneously imposed a six-year enhancement
term.
We, therefore, direct the trial court upon
remand to reduce the enhancement sentence for use of a firearm in the commission of the first degree felony of aggrava-

ted robbery from a total of six years to a
total of five years. With this correction of
the sentence, Webb's conviction is affirmed.
BENCH, J., and J. ROBERT
BULLOCK, Senior District Judge,
concur.

V

: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM

RICHFIELD CITY, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
James M. WALKER, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890156-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 26, 1990.
Driver was convicted in the Sixth Circuit Court, Sevier County, David L. Mower,
J., of being in actual, physical control of
vehicle while having blood alcohol level
of .217'. Driver appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Garff, J., held that: (1) city ordinance under which driver was convicted
was consistent with statutes, and (2) driver
was in actual, physical control of truck
while he was sleeping.
Affirmed.
1. Criminal Law e=254.2, 260.11(3)
Stipulated facts were not functional
equivalent of findings of fact, and, thus,
Court of Appeals was not required to defer
to trial court's findings.
2. Automobiles <s=>316
Municipal Corporations @=3592(2)
StaTutory prohibition against driving
or being in actual physical control of vehicle with blood alcohol content of .08% or
greater as shown by chemical test given
within two hours after alleged operation or
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physical control was consistent with ordinance that did not include language about
chemical test within two hours; another
provision of ordinance stated that blood
alcohol level at time of alleged offense~was
presumed to be at least equal to level determined by chemical test within two hours
of alleged driving or actual physical control. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-43, 41-6-44(1), 416-44.5(2).
3. Automobiles e=>316
Municipal Corporations <s>592(2)
Penalty provision of ordinance prohibiting driving under influence of alcohol was
consistent with statute indicating that first
violation was Class B misdemeanor; ordinance permitted imprisonment for 60 days
to six months and fine of $299 and merely
contained longhand description of penalty
for Class B misdemeanor. U.C.A.1953, 416-43, 41-6-44(3), 76-3-201(1), 76-3-201(2),
76-3-204(2); U.C.A.1953, 76-3-30(1978).
4. Automobiles <s=>316
Municipal Corporations <s=>592(2)
DUI ordinance allowing only for measurement of blood alcohol content of driver
was consistent with statute allowing driver's intoxication level to be determined by
measuring alcohol content in breath or
blood. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-43, 41-6-44.

8. Automobiles <£*332
Relevant factors for determining
whether driver was in actual physical control of vehicle while driver was under influence of alcohol include the following: driver's sleep; position of vehicle; running engine; driver's position in driving seat; existence of other occupants; driver's possession of key; driver's apparent ability to
start and move vehicle; manner in which
vehicle got to where it was found; and
driver's operation of vehicle to where it
was found. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.
9. Automobiles <s=>332
Driver who was sleeping in truck was
in "actual, physical control" while he was
under influence of alcohol; although driver's head was toward passenger door and
engine was not running, keys were in ignition, and headlights were on* driver had
driven truck to its position in parking lot.
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Shelden R. Carter, Harris, Carter & Harrison, Provo, for defendant and appellant.
Richard K. Chamberlain, Richfield, for
plaintiff and respondent.

5. Municipal Corporations C=>592(1)
Municipal ordinance need not be identical to controlling state statute to be consistent with it.

Before BENCH, GARFF and
LARSON,1 JJ.

6. Automobiles C=>332
Totality of circumstances must be considered to determine whether driver was in
actual physical control of vehicle while
driver was under influence of alcohol.
U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.

GARFF, Judge:
Defendant James M. Walker appeals
from his conviction of being in actual physical control of a vehicle while having a blood
alcohol level of .21%, in violation of Richfield City Ordinance 1983-2. We affirm.
At a bench trial, the following facts were
stipulated to by the parties. In the early
morning hours of June 30, 1987, defendant
drove to the Richfield Quality Inn, seeking
a room. After being informed that there
were no vacancies, he returned to his truck

7. Automobiles <£=>332
Two of the more persuasive indicia of
actual physical control while driver is under influence of alcohol are how vehicle got
to where it was found and whether defendant drove it there. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.
!• John Fair Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
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in the parking lot and went to sleep. Subsequently, he was discovered by a Sevier
County sheriffs deputy, who found defendant's truck with the engine off and the
headlights on. The doors were unlocked
and the keys were in the ignition. Defendant was asleep on the seat, with his head
toward the passenger door and a blanket
over him. Within thirty minutes of his
arrest, defendant submitted to an intoxilyzer test that registered his blood alcohol
level at .21%.
Defendant does not dispute his intoxicated state. He contends that: (1) the Richfield City ordinance under which he was
convicted is invalid, and (2) he did not have
actual physical control over the vehicle.2
[1] Because this matter was presented
on stipulated facts, which are "the functional equivalent" of findings of fact, we do
not defer to the trial court's findings. Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum Invests.,
766 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).
Where the facts are not in material dispute,
the interpretation placed thereon by the
trial court becomes a question of law,
which is not conclusive on appeal. Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah
Ct.App.1987).
VALIDITY OF THE RICHFIELD
ORDINANCE
Utah's present DUI statutes, contained
in Utah Code Ann. title 41, were enacted in
1983. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-43 (1983)
requires consistency between state law and
local ordinances:
An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs a person's driving or
being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in the
blood . . . or that governs, in relation to
2. In Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651, 652
(Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that
the language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(10)
(1953 as amended), "driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle," describes two
distinct offenses: one, operating a "motor vehicle, and the other, being in actual physical
control of a vehicle. Although section 41-6—
44(10) has since been repealed, Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44 (1988) has comparable language, "op-

any of those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or evidentiary
presumptions, or penalties o"r that governs any combination of those matters,
shall be consistent with the provisions in
this code which govern those matters.
Accordingly, Richfield City adopted all of
the 1983 amendments to Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44 (1983) in its city ordinance 1983-2.
After 1983, the legislature enacted additional
amendments to title 41 which were not
explicitly adopted by Richfield City. Defendant contends that the Richfield City
ordinance is invalid because it is now inconsistent with section 41-6-44.
There can be no question that, at the
time it was enacted, the Richfield City ordinance was consistent with the statate.
Therefore, the only question is whether
Richfield City's failure to adopt subsequent
amendments made its ordinance inconsistent and, therefore, unenforceable.
[2] We have examined both the statute
and the ordinance and, although we agree
that differences exist, we find that those
differences do not amount to an invalidating inconsistency.
First, defendant alleges that the 1987
amendment to section 41-6-44 significantly
and substantially alters the description of
the offense, thereby leaving the Richfield
City ordinance inconsistent and invalid.
The version adopted by Richfield City,
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(1) (1983), states,
in pertinent part, that:
[i]t is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any person with a
blood alcohol content of .08% or greater
by weight . . . to drive or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this
state.
The 1987 amendment to section 41-6-44(1)
added language stating that it is unlawful
erate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle." Following the reasoning in Garcia, we
interpret section 41-6-44 to also describe two
distinct offenses, operating a motor vehicle and
beingjn_actual physical control. In the present
case, the information only charged defendant
with having "actual physical control of a vehicle
with blood alcohol content of .08% or greater."
It did not charge him with operating the vehicle.
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for a person to drive or be in actual physical control of a vehicle with a blood alcohol
content of .08% or greater "as shown by a
chemical test given within two hours after
the alleged operation or physical control."
Utah Code Ann. §"41-6-44(l)(ar(1987)/
The nature of the offense and the prohibited conduct are not changed by this amendment, which only further describes the conditions that will result in a presumption of
intoxication.
In any event, these conditions were already included in another provision of the
city ordinance. Section 2 of the ordinance
adopted, by reference, the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.5(2) (1983),
which states:
If the chemical test was taken within two
hours of the alleged driving or actual
physical control, the blood alcohol level
of the person at the time of the alleged
driving or actual physical control shall be
presumed to be not less than the level of
the alcohol determined to be in the blood
by the chemical test.
Thus, the same presumption created by
the 1987 amendment is created by combining this provision with subsection 1 of the
ordinance. "Unless legislative provisions
are contradictor}' in the sense that they
cannot coexist, they are not to be deemed
inconsistent because of mere lack of uniformity in detail." Salt Lake City v.
Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671, 673
(1938). Consequently, the ordinance is consistent with the statute.
[3] Second, defendant alleges that the
1987 amendment conflicts with the ordinance
because
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 41-6-44(3) (1987) indicates that persons
convicted of a first violation are guilty of a
class B misdemeanor, while the ordinance
states that punishment shall be by "imprisonment for not less than 60 days nor more
than six months, or by a fine of $299," or
both. Richfield City Ordinance 1983-2(1.3).

P.2d 434, 436 (1968) (quoting 37 Am.Jur.,
Municipal Corporations, § 165). However, the penalty portion of an ordinance is
void if it conflicts with the general state
law governing the subject.
Here," both the ordinance and the statute
describe class B misdemeanors. The ordinance merely contains a longhand description of the penalty for a class B misdemeanor as set forth in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-3-204(2) (1978), imprisonment "for a
term not exceeding six months." Therefore, it is not inconsistent with the statute.
The ordinance also imposes a fine of up to
S299.3 Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1)
(1978) allows a court, within limits prescribed by statute, to sentence a guilty
person to pay a fine, to be imprisoned, or
both. Section 76-3-201(2) (1978) also allows a court to include a civil penalty in a
sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-30
(1978) allows a court to impose a fine of up
to $299 for a class B misdemeanor.
The punishment actually imposed upon
defendant was a forty-eight hour jail sentence and a $299 fine, plus a $250 assessment for drunk driving school and victim
restitution. Thus, defendant's actual punishment was consistent with the terms of
both the ordinance and the statute.
[4] Third, defendant contends that the
statute and the ordinance are inconsistent
because the 1987 amendment to section
41-6-44 allows a person's intoxication level
to be determined by measuring the alcohol
content in either the breath or the blood,
while Richfield City Ordinance 1983-2(1.1)
only allows for measurement of blood alcohol content. Because the ordinance follows
one of the two statutorily prescribed methods, it is consistent with the statute.

"A municipal ordinance is not in conflict
with a statute authorizing its adoption because of a difference in penalties." Salt
Lake City v. Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437

[5] We conclude that the municipal ordinance need not be identical to the controlling state statute to be consistent with it.
In Kusse, the supreme court addressed the
issue of discrepancies between state and
municipal legislation, stating, " 'In determining whether an ordinance is in conflict
with general laws, the test is whether the
ordinance permits or licenses that which

3. Subsequent amendments to the Utah Code

have increased the potential fine to $1,000.
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the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice
versa.' Judged by such a test, an ordinance is in conflict if it forbids that which
the statute permits." Kusse, 93 P.2d at
673 (quoting State v. Carran, 133 Ohio St.
50, 11 N.E.2d 245, 246 (1937)). Following
this reasoning in Layton City v. Glines,
616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980), the supreme
court also indicated that, "[t]he fact the
municipal ordinance does not encompass all
the proscriptions of the state regulation
does not render it in conflict with that
statute." Id. at 589. Because we find no
conflicts or inconsistencies in the differences pointed out by defendant, we hold
that the ordinance is valid.
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL
Defendant claims that even if the ordinance is valid, he should not have been
convicted because he was not in actual
physical control of his truck when he was
found asleep inside it.
Initially, we examine the public policy
behind the laws prohibiting being in actual
physical control of a vehicle while intoxicated:
In general, laws prohibiting driving while
intoxicated are deemed remedial statutes, to be "liberally interpreted in favor
of the public interest and against the
private interests of the drivers involved."
Specifically, actual physical control statutes have been characterized as "preventive measure[s]," which "deter individuals who have been drinking intoxicating
liquor from getting into their vehicles,
except as passengers," and which "enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes."
State v. Smelter, 36 Wash.App. 439, 674
P.2d 690, 693 (1984) (citations omitted)
(quoting State v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d
316, 319 (Minn.1981); see also State v.
Webb, 78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338, 339 (1954);
State v. Ghylin, 250 N.W.2d 252, 255
(N.D.1977); State v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d
367, 370 (N.D.1976)).
In Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651
(Utah 1982), our supreme court stated that
[a]s a matter of public policy and statu-

tory construction, we believe that the
"actual physical control" language of
Utah's implied consent statute should be
read as intending to prevent intoxicated
drivers from entering their vehicles except as passengers or passive occupants
Id. at 654.
We, therefore, apply the law to the facts
of this case in a manner consistent with the
public policy that intoxicated motorists
should be kept out of their vehicles except
as passengers or passive occupants, and
should be apprehended before they strike.
[6] A review of the relevant cases convinces us that we must look to the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether
defendant was in actual physical control of
his vehicle. In State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d
404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971), the Utah Supreme
Court held that an intoxicated motorist,
asleep in his car, was not in actual physical
control of his vehicle. The court recited
Bugger's meager facts as follows: "The
defendant was asleep in his automobile
which was parked upon the shoulder of a
road. .. The automobile was completely
off the traveled portion of the highway and
the motor was not running." Id.
In Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778
(Utah 1986) (per curiam), the supreme court
held that an intoxicated motorist, asleep at
the wheel in his inoperable truck, was in
actual physical control of his vehicle. It
did not overrule Bugger but distinguished
it, stating, "Nothing in [Bugger] indicates
that the driver was in the driver's seat at
the time he was found and arrested." Id.
at 780. It concluded that "[positioning in
the driver's seat is an element common to
all of the cases that have found actual
physical control of a motionless vehicle."
Id. (quoting Smelter, 674 P.2d at 692); see
also Fieselman v. State, 537 So.2d 603
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988); State v. Peterson,
769 P.2d 1221 (Mont.1989). Nothing in
Bugger indicates that the driver was not in
the driveFs seat at ffie time he was arrested. However, Lopez implies that Bugger
was not behind the wheel, despite the fact
that nothing in Bugger permits that as-
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sumption. Thus, positioning in the driver's
seat is a significant but not necessarily the
determining factor in ascertaining actual
physical control.
The Lopez court further found that
where the lone occupant in a vehicle was
positioned in the driver's seat, had possession of the ignition key, and had the apparent ability to start and move the vehicle, he
was in actual physical control. Although
Bugger was silent as to other indicia of
actual physical control, Lopez suggests
that possession of the ignition key and the
ability to start and move the vehicle are
relevant factors.4
[7] How the car got to its present resting place is an additional, critical factor.
The Washington Supreme Court, in Smelter, stated that:
[the] focus should not be narrowly upon
the mechanical condition of the car when
it comes to rest, but upon the status of
its occupant and the nature of the authority he or she exerted over the vehicle
in arriving at the place from which, by
virtue of its inoperability, it can no longer move. Where, as here, circumstantial
evidence permits a legitimate inference
that the car was where it was and was
performing as it was because of the defendant's choice, it follows that the defendant was in actual physical control.
Id. at 693. The defendant in Smelter was
found sitting behind the wheel of his
stopped car, which had run out of gas on
the shoulder of the highway. We agree
with the Washington court that some of
the more persuasive indicia of actual physical control are how the car got to where it
was found and whether the defendant
drove it there.
Garcia suggests that "passive occupants"
are, categorically, not in actual physical control of a vehicle in its statement that the intent of the implied consent statute is to
"prevent drivers from entering their vehicles
except as passengers or as passive occupants
as in Bugger." Garcia, 645 P.2d at 654. In
4. The supreme court, in Lopez, found that our
statute pertaining to actual physical control
"may not be construed to exclude those whose

an explanatory footnote, the Garcia court
further states that "nothing in the record
warrants a finding that the plaintiff was
physically unable to start the car, as would be
the case with an unconscious or sleeping
motorist." Id. n. 3. This dictum does not
further define a "passive occupant." Further, because the driver was not asleep in
Garcia, Garcia is factually inapposite to
the present situation. Thus, we do not
construe this language in Garcia as compelling a determination that a driver is not
in actual physical control of his vehicle
based upon only the fact that he is asleep.
Fiesclman v. State, 537 So.2d at 603, is
factually identical with the instant case.
Fieselman was charged with being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under
the influence of alcohol. He was found
lying down, asleep, on the front seat of his
car which was parked in a parking lot. The
car's lights were on and the engine was not
running. The Florida court determined
that while these facts, alone, were insufficient to find that the defendant was in
actual, physical control of the vehicle, the
additional fact of the key found in the
ignition was sufficient. Id. at 606. The
court concluded, from the evidence, that:
a reasonable inference can be drawn that
Fieselman, while intoxicated, placed the
keys in the ignition and thus was at least
at that moment in actual physical control
of the vehicle while intoxicated.
We believe that such an inference can
be drawn since a person who has placed
keys in the ignition of a vehicle may be
as much in actual physical control of the
vehicle as a person seated behind the
wheel of the vehicle. As the court recognized in Griffin [v. State, 457 So.2d 1070
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984) ], a legitimate inference to be drawn from the defendant's sitting position behind the wheel is
that the defendant "could have at any
time started the automobile and driven
away"; this inference is no less legitimate when it is drawn from the presence
of the keys in the ignition
vehicles are presently immobile because of mechanical trouble." Lopez, 720 P.2d at 781.
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Lastly, we point out that evidence that
the key was in the ignition does not
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the
defendant was in actual physical control
of the vehicle. It is merely a fact—along
with the defendant's presence asleep and
intoxicated in the vehicle—which, being
capable of establishing the defendant's
actual physical control of the vehicle,
precludes the conclusion that as a matter of law the defendant was not in actual physical control of the vehicle
Id. at 606-07.
[8] In summary, we look to the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether
defendant was in actual physical control of
his vehicle. Relevant factors for making
this determination include, but are not limited to the following: (1) whether defendant was asleep or awake when discovered:
(2) the position of the automobile; (3)
whether the automobile's motor was running; (4) whether defendant was positioned
in the driver's seat of the vehicle; (5)
whether defendant was the vehicle's sole
occupant; (6) whether defendant had possession of the ignition key; (7) defendant's
apparent ability to start and move the vehicle; (8) how the car got to where it was
found; and (9) whether defendant drove it
there.
[9] In the present case, the following
facts are relevant: defendant, the vehicle's
sole occupant, was asleep in a prone position on the seat with his head toward the
passenger door. Although the vehicle's
motor was not running, the keys were in
the ignition and the headlights were on.
Defendant had driven the vehicle to its
position in the parking lot, from which it
could easily be moved, and immediately
returned to his truck upon learning that
there were no vacancies at the motel.5
5. Defendant's counsel proffered:
Mr. Walker, in his testimony, would state that
he approached the motel. He m e r a guest at
that hotel leaving say, "It's full, you cannot go
in. It's occupied." So Mr. Walker at that
time turned around and went to his truck, put
the pillow on the bench of the truck seat, laid
down and went to sleep.
790 P 2d—4

Whether defendant was asleep with his
head on the steering wheel or stretched out
on the seat, he would still be capable of
driving off as soon as he awakened. Further, if he had prior control and was responsible for the car being in its present
position, especially if the keys were still in
the ignition and the headlights were on, he
is ready to go, and the potential for tragedy is present. It is this circumstance that
the legislature specifically wanted to prevent when it enacted laws prohibiting a
driver from being in actual physical control
of a vehicle while intoxicated. The legislative intent behind drunk driving laws is to
protect the public by apprehending intoxicated drivers before they kill or maim
someone. This professed public policy deserves more than mere lip service. To focus exclusively upon the fact that the driver was not sitting in the driver's seat or
that he was asleep and to ignore other
relevant factors, as defendant would have
us do, is illogical. Thus, we conclude, under a totality of the circumstances, that
defendant was in actual, physical control of
the vehicle.
Defendant makes a compelling argument
that intoxicated drivers should be encouraged to pull off to the side of the road to
sleep it off.6 This approach is more appropriately the province of the legislature.
See Fieselman, 537 So.2d at 606. If the
legislature deems it desirable to encourage
drinking drivers to pull off the road and
refrain from driving while intoxicated, it
could delete the words "or be in physical
control of" to accomplish that purpose.
We affirm defendant's conviction.
BENCH and LARSON, JJ., concur.
(O
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6. In State v. Peterson, 769 P.2d 1221, 1224
(Mont. 1989), the Montana Supreme Court rejectedjjiis argument^ stating, "The better policy
is that a person should ascertain his ability to
dri\e before climbing behind the wheel and terrorizing the roadways of this state."
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den. In that case, however, the trial court
dismissed the robbery charge on its own
volition. That is not the case here.
The District Attorney's office,^an arm.
of the state, and under the direct supervision of the Attorney General (67-5-1),
that is appealing here,—a somewhat unorthodox and inconsistent circumstance,—
made the motion to dismiss the action,
which at that point was as much an issue
as Combs' restraint of liberty. It would
seem that before this court orders the
trial court to do much of anything the
matter of that motion to dismiss and the
resulting dismissal, all for a presumably
good cause, should be resolved.
In addition to the position I take on the
aspect of this case reflected in the paragraph immediately above, I urge that perhaps we made a mistake in the remand
portion of the McGuffey case and that we
should overrule that part of it. The instant case itself seems to point up the advisability of so doing. To do anything
more could lead us on safari in a civil
proceeding down a road into an erstwhile
juristic jungle of no return.

O
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23 Utah 2d 404
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Charles BUGGER, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12278.

Supreme Court of Utah.
April 6, 1971.

Defendant was convicted in the Second
District Court, Davis County, Thornley K.
Swan, J., of being in actual physical control of his vehicle while under influence
of intoxicating liquor, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court, Tuckett, J., held that
defendant who was asleep in his automobile which was completely off traveled por-

tion of highway and whose motor was not
running at time investigating officer
awakened defendant and detected smell of
alcohol was not in "actual physical control
of a n y vehicle ,, in violation of statute
proscribing such behavior at time of his
arrest.
Reversed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Automobiles 0 3 3 2

Defendant who was asleep in his automobile which was completely off traveled
portion of highway and whose motor was
not running at time investigating officer
awakened defendant and detected smell of
alcohol was not in "actual physical control
of any vehicle'' in violation of statute
proscribing such behavior at time of his
arrest. U.C.A.1953, 41-6-44.
See publication AVords and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

Robert Van Sciver, Van Sciver, Florence, Hutchison & Sharp, Salt Lake City,
for defendant-appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren
N. Beasley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake
City, for plaintiff-respondent.
T U C K E T T , Justice:
The defendant was found guilty of a
violation of Section 41-6-44, U.C.A.1953,
and from that conviction he has appealed
to this court.
During the night of July 28, 1969, the
defendant was asleep in his automobile
which was parked upon the shoulder of a
road known as Tippet's Lane in Davis
County. The automobile was completely
off the traveled portion of the highway
and the motor was not running. An officer
of the Highway Patrol stopped at the scene
and discovered the defendant was asleepWith some effort the officer succeeded n1
awakening the defendant, at which time trie
officer detected the smell of alcohol an
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arrested the defendant for being in actual
physical control of the vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor.
The complaint charges the defendant
ith
the violation of the statute above rew
ferred to which provides as follows:
It is unlawful and punishable as provided in subsection (d) of this section
for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive or be
in actual physical control of any vehicle
within this state.
The defendant is here challenging the
validity of the statute on the grounds of
vagueness. However, we need not decide
the case upon that ground. That part of
the statute which states: "be in actual physical control of any vehicle" has been before the courts of other jurisdictions which
have statutes with similar wordings. The
word "actual" has been defined as meaning "existing in act or reality; * * * in
action or existence at the time being;
present; * * *." The word "physical"
is defined as "bodily," and "control" is defined as "to exercise restraining or directing influence over; to dominate; regulate;
hence, to hold from actions; to curb,"
The term in "actual physical control" in
its ordinary sense means "existing" or
"present bodily restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation." x It is
clear that in the record before us the facts
do not bring the case within the wording
of the statute. The defendant at the time
of his arrest was not controlling the vehicle, nor was he exercising any dominion
over it. It is noted that the cases cited by
the plaintiff in support of its position in
this matter deal with entirely different fact
situations, such as the case where the driver
was seated in his vehicle on the traveled
portion of the highway; or where the motor of the vehicle was operating; or where
the driver was attempting to steer the automobile while it was in motion; or where
I. State v. Webb, 7S Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d
33S; State v. Ruona, 133 Mont. 243,
321 P.2d 615; Ohio v. Wilgus, Com.PL,

he was attempting to brake the vehicle to
arrest its motion.
We are of the opinion that the facts in
this case do not make out a violation of
the statute and the defendant's conviction
is reversed. We do not consider it necessary to discuss the other claimed errors
raised by the defendant.
CALLISTER, C J., and H E N R I O D
and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
E L L E T T , Justice (dissenting).
I dissent.
The statute formerly made it unlawful
for a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor to drive any vehicle upon any
highway within this state. 1 The amendment
added a provision making it unlawful to
be in actual physical control of a vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. It removed the need to be upon a
highway before the crime was made out
and did away with the necessity of driving
before a crime was committed.
The reason for the change is obvious.
It is better to prevent an intoxicated person
in charge of an automobile from getting
on the highway than it is to punish him
after he gets on it. The amended statute
gives officers a right to arrest a drunk
person in the control of an automobile and
thus prevent him from wreaking havoc
a minute later by getting in traffic, or from
injuring himself by his erratic driving.
It does not matter whether the motor
is running or is idle nor whether the drunk
is in the front seat or in the back seat.
His potentiality for harm is lessened but
not obviated by a silent motor or a backseat position—provided, of course, that he
is the one in control of the car. It only
takes a flick of the wrist to start the motor
or to engage the gears, and it requires only
a moment of time to get under the wheel
from the back seat. A drunk in control
17 Ohio Supp. 34; Parker v. State (Okl.
Cr.App.), 424 P.2d 997; 47 A.L.R.2d 582.
I. Sec. 57-7-14, R.S.U.1933.
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of a motor vehicle has such a propensity
to cause harm that the statute intended to
make it criminal for him to be in a position
to do so.
Restraining the movement of a vehicle
is controlling it as much as moving it is.
A person finding a drunk in the back seat
of a car parked in one's driveway is likely
to learn who is in control of that car if
he should attempt to move it. A drunk
may maliciously block one's exit, and in
doing so he is in control of his own vehicle.
I think the defendant in this case was in
control of his truck within the meaning of
the statute even though he may have been
asleep. He had the key and was the only
one who could drive it. The fact that he
chose to park it is no reason to say he was
not in control thereof.
I, therefore, think that we should consider the question which he raises in his
brief as to the validity of the statute.
Cases wherein an attack was made on
statutes like ours have been decided in a
number of jurisdictions. They hold the
statute good.
In the case of State v. Webb, 7S Ariz.
8, 274 P.2d 338 (1954), the defendant was
intoxicated and asleep in a truck parked
next to some barricades in a lane of traffic. An officer passed by and observed
no one in the car. Later he returned and
found the defendant "passed out." The
statute made it a crime to be in actual
physical control of a car while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. The defendant contended that the wording of the
statute was not meant to apply to a situation where the car was parked and that it
was only concerned with the driving of an
automobile and other acts and conduct of a
positive nature. In holding that the statute
was applicable to the conduct of the defendant, the court said:
An intoxicated person seated behind
the steering wheel of a motor vehicle is
a threat to the safety and welfare of
the public. The danger is less than that
involved when the vehicle is actually
moving, but it does exist.

In the case of Parker v. State, 424 P.2d
997 (Okl.Cr.App.1967), the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a statute
making it unlawful for "any person who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor
to drive, operate, or be in actual physical
control of any motor vehicle within this
state." There the defendant (appellant)
claimed that the statute was unconstitutional in that it was so vague and indefinite
that a person charged thereunder would be
deprived of due process of law. The court
held that the statute did not violate any
of appellant's constitutional rights.
Under a similar statute the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont.
243, 321 P.2d 615 (1958), held that the
statute was not void for vagueness, and in
doing so said:
* * * Thus one could have "actual
physical control" while merely parking
or standing still so long as one was
keeping the car in restraint or in position to regulate its movements. Preventing a car from moving is as much control
and dominion as actually putting the car
in motion on the highway. Could one
exercise any more regulation over a
thing, while bodily present, than prevention of movement or curbing movement.
As long as one were physically or bodily
able to assert dominion, in the sense of
movement, then he has as much control
over an object as he would if he were
actually driving the vehicle.
*

*

*

*

*

*

* * * [I]t is quite evident that the
statute in the instant case is neither
vague nor uncertain. * * *
The appellant here claims some federally
protected rights in that he says he was improperly arrested. It is difficult for me to
see where that has anything to do with
guilt or innocence. If he were improperly
arrested, he would have an action against
the officer for false arrest, but surely our
courts have not lost contact with reality
to the extent that we turn a guilty man
free simply "because the constable may
have blundered."

PETERSON v. CONTINEN AL CASUALTY COMPANY
Cite as 4

From what has been said above, there
is absolutely no merit to this claim. By
being in control of an automobile while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
the defendant wras guilty of a misdemeanor
which was in the presence of the officer,
and the officer had a right and a duty to
arrest him. 2
The defendant was found guilty in the
court below of being in actual physical
control of his truck while he was under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. He
does not dispute that he was drunk. If the
statute is good, we should not attempt to
overrule the trier of the facts and find
that the defendant was not the one actually controlling his truck.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
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1. Insurance §=452
Person on foot does not cease to be
"pedestrian" within policy covering injuries sustained while a pedestrian merely
because he is not in motion.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Insurance C==452

Where farmer was working about
idling farm tractor located on his private
property and it rolled forward and crushed
him, he was "pedestrian" within policy
covering injury "sustained in consequence
of being struck by any land conveyance
while a pedestrian."

Thomas S. Taylor, of Chnstensen, Taylor & Moody, Provo, for defendant-appellant.
Tex R. Olsen, of Olsen & Chamberlain,
Richfield, for plaintiff-respondent.
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H E N R I O D , Justice:

Irene A. PETERSON, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, a
corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 12187.

Supreme Court of Utah.
March 29, 1971.

Appeal by insurer from judgment of
the Sixth District Court, Sevier County,
Ferdinand Erickson, J., holding that deceasea was covered by accident policy.
The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., held that
where farmer was working about idling
farm tractor located on his private property and it rolled forward and crushed him,
he was "pedestrian" within policy covering
injury "sustained in consequence of being
struck by any land conveyance while a pedestrian."
Affirmed.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.

Appeal from what was labeled a summary judgment for plaintiff which actually
was a judgment on all available facts, under an insurance policy covering injury
"sustained in consequence of being struck
by any land conveyance while a pedestrian." Affirmed, with costs to plaintiff.
Believable evidence elicited under the
discovery process indicates that plaintiff's
farmer husband was crushed by a tractor
that, driverless, had rolled down a rise, all
of which occurred on his private property.
The only question is whether the deceased was a "pedestrian" under the terms
of the policy. The trial court said he was,
—a conclusion with which we agree,—no
one questioning the fact that the tractor
was a "land conveyance," and it appearing
that the vehicle, out of gear, simply traveled dowjihill as mentioned, and quite obviously ran over the deceased.
[1,2] Appellant indulges a non sequitur
by assuming that coverage under the policy

2. Sec. 77-13-3(1), U.C.A.1953.
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band in the amount of $16,265.66. The
judgment rendered in favor of Vera's estate
on the creditor's claim against Sergey's estate is affirmed.
'
We remand to the trial court for entry of
judgment against Beverly Scott and her
husband, in accordance with this opinion.
DURHAM and WARD WILLIAMS, JJ.,
concur.

36 Wash.App. 439
STATE of Washington, Respondent,
v.
Timothy J. SMELTER, Appellant
No. 12793-4-1.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 1.
Jan. 11, 1984.
After the defendant was convicted in
the district court of being in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, the Superior Court, King County, Frank D. Howard,
J., affirmed the judgment and sentence,
and discretionary review was granted. The
Court of Appeals,. Corbett, J., held that
defendant, who was found intoxicated behind the wheel of an automobile which was
stopped, with its engine off and out of gas,
partly on left shoulder of southbound lane
of a major freeway, near several exits and
gas stations, was in "actual physical control" of vehicle for purposes of statute making a person guilty of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor if he has
actual physical control of the vehicle and .10
percent or more by weight of alcohol in his
blood as shown by chemical analysis of his
breath, blood, or other bodily substance.
Affirmed.

1. Automobiles <§=>332
The term "actual physical control,"
within statute making a person guilty of
being in-actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug if he has actual
physical control of a vehicle and .10 percent
or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as
shown by chemical analysis of his breath,
blood, or other bodily substance, focuses not
upon the mechanical condition of the vehicle when it comes to rest, but upon the
status of its occupant and the nature of the
authority he exerted over the vehicle in
arriving at the place from which, by virtue
of its inoperability, it can no longer move,
and encompasses those situations where circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate
inference that the vehicle was where it was
and was performing as it was because of
the individual's choice. West's RCWA 46.61.504.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Automobiles <s=>332
Defendant, who was found intoxicated
behind the wheel of an automobile which
was stopped, with its engine off and out of
gas, partly on left shoulder of southbound
lane of a major freeway, near several exits
and gas stations, was in "actual physical
control" of vehicle for purposes of statute
making a person guilty of being in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor if
he has actual physical control of the vehicle
and .10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by chemical analysis of his breath, blood, or other bodily
substance. West's RCWA 46.61.504.

Powe, Hough, Bingham & Allen, Thomas
W. Bingham, Seattle, for appellant.
Norman K. Maleng, King County Pros.
Atty., Scott McKay, Nicole Maclnnes, Deputy Pros. Attys., Thornton Hatter, Senior
Intern, Seattle, for respondent.

STATE v. SMELTER

Wash.

691

Cite as 674 P.2d 690 (WastuApp. 1984)

CORBETT, Judge.
Defendant, Timothy J. Smelter, appeals
his judgment and sentence for being in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor. We affirm.
A Washington State Patrol trooper observed the defendant seated behind the
wheel of an automobile which was stopped,
with its engine off, partly on the left shoulder of southbound Interstate 5. The vehicle
was out of gas. Based upon the officer's
observations, the defendant was arrested
and a breathalyzer test administered. At
trial, the defendant stipulated that he had
alcohol in his blood exceeding .10 percent by
weight. The district court judge found that
the defendant's automobile was reasonably
capable of being operated and found the
defendant guilty. The matter was heard by
the superior court and the judgment and
sentence affirmed. Discretionary review
has been granted to determine whether a
motor vehicle must be "operable" in order
for an individual to be found guilty of violating RCW 46.61.504. The statute in pertinent part provides:
A person is guilty of being in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or any drug if he has actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state
while:
(1) He has a 0.10 percent or more by
weight of alcohol in his blood as shown by
chemical analysis of his breath, blood, or
other bodily substance made under RCW
46.61.506, as now or hereafter amended;
RCW 46.61.504.
Defendant argues that actual movement
of the vehicle is not an element of the
offense, McGuire v. Seattle, 31 Wash.App.
438, 442, 642 P.2d 765 (1982), but that the
ability to move or operate the vehicle is.
He contends that he was unable to move his
vehicle because it was out of gas, and thus_
he was not in actual physical control of it.
There are essentially three types of statutes dealing with intoxicated persons and
motor vehicles: those which prohibit "driv-

ing" while intoxicated, those which prohibit
"operating" a motor vehicle while intoxicated, and those which forbid an intoxicated
person to be in "actual physical control" of
a motor vehicle. Jacobson v. State, 551
P.2d 935, 937 (Alaska 1976). Washington
prohibits driving while under the influence,
RCW 46.61.502, and being in actual physical
control while under the influence. RCW
46.61.504. An "operator or driver" is
defined as one "who drives or is in actual
physical control of a vehicle," RCW 46.04.370, the disjunctive formulation suggesting
that two different types of activity are
contemplated.
While the verb "drive" is nowhere
defined in the Washington Motor Vehicle
Code, driving is the most restrictive of the
three categories of activities, see State v.
Purcell, 336 A.2d 223, 225 (Del.Super.1975),
specifically requiring motion of the motor
vehicle. County of Milwaukee v. Proegler,
95 Wis.2d 614, 291 N.W.2d 608, 613 (Wis.
App.1980). Generally, "to operate" includes
a larger class of activities than "to drive";
one who drives a motor vehicle necessarily
operates it, but the reverse is not necessarily so. Jacobson v. State, supra at 937.
While courts interpreting drunk driving
statutes occasionally speak in terms of "operating a motor vehicle," People v. Hoffman, 53 Misc.2d 1010, 280 N.Y.S.2d 169,170
(Dist.Ct. Nassau County 1967), it has been
stated with frequency that "operating a
vehicle" and "being in actual physical control" define two distinct offenses. Cincinnati v. Kelley, 47 Ohio St.2d 94, 351 N.E.2d
85, 86 (Ohio 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S.
1104, 97 S.Ct. 1131, 51 L.Ed.2d 554 (1977);
State v. Wilgus, 31 Ohio Op. 443 (Ct.Com.Pl.
1945), cited in State v. Ruona, 133 Mont.
243, 321 P.2d 615, 618 (1958); Crane v.
Oklahoma, 461 P.2d 986, 988 (Okla.Cr.1969).
No Washington case or statute defines
"actual physical control" as the term is used
in RCW 46.61.504. The question of actual
physical control isr.according to WPIC 92.11, Comment, "an issue of law or at best a
mixed issue of law and fact," and the dictionary definition of the words "actual,"
"physical," and "control" may be used. The
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formulation of the dictionary definition employed by the Supreme Court of Montana
has been widely adopted: "Using the term
in 'actual physical control' in its composite
sense, it means 'existinjf~or 'presentlSodily
restraint, directing influence, domination or
regulation/" State v. Ruona, supra, 321
P.2d at 618. Accord, Kansas City v. Troutner, 544 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Mo.App.1976);
State v. Ghylin, 250 N.W.2d 252, 254 (N.D.
1977); Hughes v. State, 535 P.2d 1023,1024
(Okl.Cr.1975); Commonwealth v. Kloch, 230
Pa.Super. 563, 327 A.2d 375, 383 (1974);
State v. Bugger, 25 Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d
442, 443 (1971).
Defendant claims that a vehicle operability requirement is "clear" from a reading of
State v. Ruona, supra, 321 P.2d at 618:
As long as one were physically or bodily
able to assert dominion, in the sense of
movement, then he has as much control
over an object as he would if he were
actually driving the vehicle.
However, the Ruona court, in distinguishing
the offenses of "operating" and "being in
actual physical control" of a motor vehicle,
cited with approval a definition of "control"
that meant more than the " 'ability to stop
an automobile/" and included " 'the authority to manage.' " State v. Ruona, supra
321 P.2d at 618, quoting State v. Wilgus,
supra. Actual physical control has elsewhere been broadly defined as " 'exclusive
physical power and present ability to operate, move, park or direct whatever use or
non-use was to be made of the motor vehicle at the moment/ " State v. Purcell, supra at 226. Motion of the vehicle is not an
element of actual physical control.
McGuire v. Seattle, supra 31 Wash.App. at
442, 642 P.2d 765. Accord, State v. Webb,
78 Ariz. 8, 274 P.2d 338, 340 (1954); Kansas
City v. Troutner, supra at 299; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 237 Pa.Super. 212, 352
A.2d 137, 139 (1975). Several courts have
found defendants to be in actual physical
control of vehicles whose motors were not
running. E.g., State v. Ghylin, supra at 253
(getting out of car in ditch, keys in hand);
Slate v. Schuler, 243 N.W.2d 367, 369-70
(N.D.1976) (seated in driver's seat of car in
ditch, keys in ignition); Cincinnati v. Kel-

ley, supra 351 N.E.2d at 86 (seated in driver's seat of parked car, keys in ignition).
Only three cases have been brought to
.our attention in which the court found no
actual physical control of a motionless vehicle whose motor was not running, and none
is of aid to the defendant here. In State v.
Bugger, supra 483 P.2d at 442-43, the court,
applying the Ruona definition, found that a
defendant who was asleep in a car parked
completely off the traveled portion of the
highway was not in actual physical control.
The same result would obtain under RCW
46.61.504, which specifically prohibits conviction of a defendant who has moved his
vehicle safely off the roadway. In Bearden
v. State, 430 P.2d 844, 845-47 (Okl.Cr.1967),
the court found no actual physical control
where the defendant was found lying unconscious at the side of the road, outside his
vehicle. Positioning in the driver's seat is
an element common to all of the cases that
have found actual physical control of a motionless vehicle, and that is the position in
which the defendant here was found. The
court in Key v. Town of Kinsey, 424 So.2d
701, 703-04 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), formulated
the following list of elements of actual
physical control:
1. Active or constructive possession of
the vehicle's ignition key by the person
charged or, in the alternative, proof that
such a key is not required for the vehicle's operation;
2. Position of the person charged in
the driver's seat, behind the steering
wheel, and in such condition that, except
for the intoxication, he or she is physically capable of starting the engine and
causing the vehicle to move;
3. A vehicle that is operable to some
extent.
The defendant in Key did not meet these
criteria because the car was out of gas, and
his son, who had the car keys, had walked
to get gas. There was also evidence that
the son, and not the defendant, was the
driver. Although the opinion is not entirely
clear, it appears that the court was relying
more on the absence of the ignition keys, on
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the issue of present ability to control the
car, than upon the car being out of gas, in
determining that there was no actual physical control by the defendant. Key, supra at
704. The cryptic reference to operability
was not explained, but it would appear to
be compatible with the "reasonably capable
of being rendered operable" standard employed by the trial judge in the instant case.
A definition of "control" that focuses
upon "the authority to manage" a motor
vehicle, perhaps as evidenced by lawful possession of the keys while seated in the driver's seat, would permit a finding of actual
physical control of an inoperable vehicle.
The question of what constitutes the elements of actual physical control, such as
whether the motor must be running or, by
extension, whether the vehicle must be operable, has been characterized as a policy
issue. State v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316,
320 (Minn.1981). In general, laws prohibiting driving while intoxicated are deemed
remedial statutes, to be "liberally interpreted in favor of the public interest and
against the private interests of the drivers
involved." Id. at 319. Specifically, actual
physical control statutes have been characterized as "preventive measure[s]," State v.
Schuler, supra at 370, which "deter individuals who have been drinking intoxicating
liquor from getting into their vehicles, except as passengers," State v. Ghylin, supra
at 255, and which "enable the drunken driver to be apprehended before he strikes."
State v. Webb, supra 274 P.2d at 339.
[1,2] The "reasonably capable of being
rendered operable" standard employed by
the trial court here distinguishes a car that
runs out of gas on a major freeway near
several exits and gas stations from a car
with a cracked block which renders it "totally inoperable." The difficulty in attempting to formulate a unitary standard
of operability arises from the necessity of
setting out the degree of inoperability
which will preclude prosecution under RCW
46.61.504. The focus should not be narrowly upon the mechanical condition of the car
when it comes to rest, but upon the status
of its occupant and the nature of the au-

thority he or she exerted over the vehicle in
arriving at the place from which, by virtue
of its inoperability, it can no longer move.
Where, as here, circumstantial evidence permits a legitimate inference that the car was
where it was and was performing as it was
because of the defendant's choice, it follows
that the defendant was in actual physical
control. To hold otherwise could conceivably allow an intoxicated driver whose vehicle was rendered inoperable in a collision to
escape prosecution. Such a result was
avoided in Commonwealth v. Taylor, supra
352 A.2d at 140, in which the defendant's
actual driving ended in a collision that sent
his vehicle off the highway. He was seated
on the driver's side after the crash, and the
court noted that "it could be inferred that
the car was where it was and the condition
in which it was because of appellant's
choice 'from which it followed that appellant was in "actual physical control" and so
was "operating" the c a r . . . . ' This 'physical control' continued in the appellant after
the collision had immobilized his car." Id.
In the instant case, extrinsic evidence
that the defendant, while intoxicated, drove
his vehicle until it ran out of gas, together
with his admission of these facts, supports a
finding that he was in actual physical control of his vehicle when apprehended. See
State v. Ghylin, supra at 253-54 (fact that
car was stuck in a ditch, coupled with defendant's admissions that he was driving
and other evidence, found to be sufficient
evidence of actual physical control). Such
an analysis finds support in the latest statement on the subject by the Supreme Court
of Montana, whose definition of actual
physical control in State v. Ruona, supra
321 P.2d at 618, has been widely adopted.
In a case in which the defendant was found
asleep behind the wheel of a motor vehicle
which was stuck in a pit, the court applied
the same analysis as employed in cases
where a defendant is found asleep or passed
out behind the wheel of a movable vehicle.
Actual physical control is found in those
cases on the theory that the defendant is in
a position to regulate the vehicle's movements, or has authority to manage the vehicle:
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Just as a motorist remains in a position to had rested its case in chief and, though
regulate a vehicle while asleep behind its defendant was entitled to a ruling before he
steering wheel, so does he remain in a took the stand, he waived his right to a
position to regulate a^vehicle while-asleep - timely rujing when he proceeded to testify
behind the steering wheel of a vehicle about his prior conviction on direct examistuck in a borrow pit. He has not relin- nation without renewing his motion, thus
quished regulation of or control over the precluding the trial court from ruling on
vehicle. It does not matter that the vehi- the motion at a time when the refusal to
rule would have been error.
cle is incapable of moving.
State v. Taylor, 661 P.2d 33, 34 (Mont.1983)
Affirmed.
(emphasis added).
Clearly, based on the circumstances of the
defendant's apprehension and his own ad- 1. Criminal Law c=>632(4)
A motion in limine is the proper procemissions, the trial court did not err in finddure
to obtain an early ruling on the admising that the vehicle was reasonably capable
sibility
of prior convictions and, though an
of being operated or rendered operable and,
early
ruling
is helpful to both parties and
therefore, that the defendant was in actual
avoids
interruption
on proceedings before
physical control of the vehicle.
the jury, there is no requirement that the
Affirmed.
trial court make such a ruling before the
defendant takes the witness stand.
ANDERSEN, C.J., and DURHAM, J.,
concur.
2. Criminal Law c=>632(4)
It is reasonable and proper for a trial
court
to defer its ruling on a motion in
G \ KEY NUMBER SYSTEM>
limine to exclude prior convictions until it
knows enough about the case to be able to
make an intelligent decision.
36 Wash.App. 451
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Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court, King County, George Revelle, J.,
of first-degree arson, and he appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Scholfield, J., held that
the trial court did not err in declining to
rule on defendant's motion in limine to exclude a prior conviction before the State

3. Criminal Law c=>706(5)
Until the trial court has ruled on a
motion in limine to exclude prior convictions, any question relating to those convictions should not be asked in the presence of
the jury.
4. Criminal Law c=>632(4)
The trial court did not err in declining
to rule on defendant's motion in limine to
exclude a prior conviction before the State
had rested its case in chief and, though
defendant was entitled to a ruling before he
took the stand, he waived his right to a
timely ruling when he proceeded to testify
about his prior conviction on direct examination without renewing his motion, thus
precluding the trial court from ruling on
the motion at a time when the refusal to
rule would have been error.
5. Criminal Law ®=*632(4)
A trial court should not defer ruling on
a timely motion in limine to exclude prior

